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Prosecuting Iraqi Crimes: Fulfilling the
Expectations of International Law After
the Gulf War
Louis Rene Beres*
Coalition military action against Iraqi forces commenced on
January 16, 1991. This collective resort to force represented a
last attempt to remove Iraqi military units from Kuwait, which
had been occupied since Saddam Hussein's invasion of August
2, 1990. On the very same day of the Iraqi invasion, UN Secur-
ity Council Resolution 660: (1) Condemned the Iraqi invasion of
Kuwait; (2) Demanded that Iraq withdraw immediately and un-
conditionally all its forces to the positions in which they were
located on August 1, 1990; (3) Called upon Iraq and Kuwait to
begin immediately intensive negotiations for the resolution of
their differences and to support all efforts in this regard, espe-
cially those of the League of Arab States. The war ended when
Iraq formally accepted all of the United States-led coalition's
terms for a permanent ceasefire on March 3, 1991. Significantly,
although elimination of all Iraqi nonconventional force capabili-
ties was an integral part of the ceasefire agreement, Iraq contin-
ued after the war to seek a thermonuclear weapons capacity and
to disguise this effort from UN inspectors.'
* Professor of International Law, Purdue University, West Lafayette, Indiana. I wish to
give special thanks to Betty Hartman of the Purdue University Department of Political Sci-
ence for her expeditious and skillful typing of this manuscript.
1. N.Y. Times, Oct. 8, 1991, at Al, col. 3. On October 7, 1991, more than seven months
after the conclusion of hostilities, "United Nations inspectors . . . discovered a complex of
buildings that apparently served as the nerve center of President Saddam Hussein's covert
nuclear weapons program, but had largely escaped allied attack during the Persian Gulf war."
Id. It was here, at an "installation called Al Atheer about 40 miles south of Baghdad," that
Iraq planned-according to the report-"to design and produce a nuclear device." Id. For
assessments of nuclear weapons under international law, see The Illegality of Nuclear Weap-
ons: Statement of the Lawyer's Committee on Nuclear Policy, 8 ALTERNATIVES: A JOURNAL
OF WORLD POLICY 291 (1982); R. FALK, E. MEYROWITZ & J. SANDERSON, NUCLEAR WEAP-
ONS AND INTERNATIONAL LAW (1981); Fried, First Use of Nuclear Weapons - Existing
Prohibitions in International Law, 1981 BULLETIN OF PEACE PROPOSALS 21-29; Lippman, Nu-
clear Weapons and International Law: Towards A Declaration on the Prevention and Punish-
ment of the Crime of Nuclear Humancide, 8 Loy L.A. INT'L & COMP. L.J. 183 (1986); Wes-
ton, Nuclear Weapons and International Law: Illegality in Context, 13 DEN. J. INT'L L. &
POL'Y (1983); Brownlie, Some Legal Aspects of the Use of Nuclear Weapons, 14 INT'L &
COMP. LQ. 437 (1965); Boyle, The Relevance of International Law to the "Paradox" of Nu-
clear Deterrence, Nw. U.L. REV. 1407 (1986); Stegenga, Nuclearism and International Law,
4 PUB. AFF. Q. 69 (Jan. 1990); G. BEST, HUMANITY IN WARFARE (1980); J. JOHNSON, JUST
DICKINSON JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
I. Introduction
To pursue international legal norms of justice in the closing dec-
ade of the twentieth century is to invite anguish. Preoccupied with
mere survival and afflicted by growing suffering, our species has now
become an intolerable burden to itself. Although the intent of inter-.
national law is to reduce or even to reverse such tragic self-destruc-
tiveness, for the present, at least, emancipation will have to arise
largely from non-jurisprudential sources.
Yet, even in our Age of Atrocity, international law can try to
narrow the gap between what is expected of states and. actual state
beh.vior. This requires, of course, that significant crimes be duly
noted and prosecuted, that violators are effectively prevented from
confidently expecting their misdeeds to have been undertaken with
impunity. At this particular moment, this requirement would best be
fulfilled by dedicated and energetic prosecution of recent and ongo-
ing Iraqi crimes.
II. Iraqi Crimes and Their Prosecution
Shocked by still mounting evidence of Iraqi atrocities against
civilians2 and combatants of diverse nationalities, the victorious coa-
WAR TRADITION AND THE RESTRAINT OF WAR (1981); NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND INTERNA-
TIONAL LAW (I. Pogany ed. 1987); Arbess, The International Law of Armed Conflict in Light
of Contemporary Deterrence Strategies: Empty Promise or Meaningful Restraint?, 30 Mc-
GILL L.J. 189 (1984); Thomas, Atomic Bombs in International Society, 39 AM. J. INT'L L. 736
(1945); Stowell, Laws of War and the Atomic Bomb, 39 AM. J. INT'L L. 784 (1945); Moore,
Nuclear Weapons and the Law: Enhancing Strategic Stability, 9 BROOKLYN J. INT'L L. 263
(1983); Rostow, The Great Nuclear Debate, 8 YALE J. WORLD PUB. ORD. 87 (1981); Meyro-
witz, The Opinions of Legal Scholars on the Legal Status of Nuclear Weapons, 24 STAN. J.
INT'L L. 111 (1987); Weston, Nuclear Weapons Versus International Law. A Contextual Re-
assessment, 28 McGILL L.J. 542 (1983); Fried, The Nuclear Collision Course: Can Interna-
tional Law Be of Help, 14 DEN. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 97 (1985); and F. BOYLE, THE CRIMINAL-
ITY OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS (Nuclear Age Peace Foundation Booklet #27, Waging Peace
Series, 1991).
2. Civilians are generally mentioned as "persons taking no active part in the hostilities,
including members of the armed forces who have laid down their arms and those placed hors
de combat by sickness, wounds, detention, or any other cause ...." Convention Relative to
the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, T.I.A.S. No.
3365, 75 U.N.T.S. 287 [hereinafter Geneva Convention].
3. These atrocities continued within Iraq even after the Gulf War. Crimes such as those
directed primarily against Kurdish and Palestinian minorities became matters of international
concern because of their international impact and because they outraged the conscience of
humankind. See, M.C. Bassiouni, The Proscribing Function of International Law in the
Processes of International Protection of Human Rights, 9 YALE J. WORLD PUB. ORD. 193,
1949 (1982). International law now concedes that limits to the authoritative omnipotence of
each state are determined not only by the requirements of international comity, but also by the
inherent rights of each individual person to claims of life and dignity. See infra, note 49. There
are four bases of law (i.e., international conventions; international custom, as evidence of a
general practice, accepted as law; the general principles of law recognized by civilized nations;
and judicial decisions and the teachings of the most highly qualified publicists of the various
nations). STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE art. 38(1). The jurisprudential
bases of this concession may be found in all of the sources of international law identified at
Article 38 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice. STATUTE OF THE I.C.J., June 26,
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lition should now begin immediate preparations for "another Nu-
remberg."" Animated by the original trials for crimes of war, a
crimes against peace, and crimes against humanity,6 and by the as-
sociated ancient principle of nullum crimen sine poena (no crime
without a punishment)7 , this coalition also would have to make some
difficult judgments.' Among these decisions are important legal
1945, 59 Stat. 1031, T.S. No. 993, 3 Bevans 1153.
4. In June 1945 the governments of the United States, France, the United Kingdom,
and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics agreed to hold a conference in London to negotiate
an agreement providing for a trial of German leaders by an international military tribunal.
The result of the London Conference was the Agreement for the Prosecution and Punishment
of the Major War Criminals of the European Axis, Aug. 8, 1945, 59 Stat. 1544, E.A.S. No.
472, 82 U.N.T.S. 279 [hereinafter London Agreement]. Also note that the London Charter is
annexed to the London Agreement.
5. Today, the laws of war, or jus in bello, comprise: (1) laws on weapons; (2) laws on
warfare; and (3) humanitarian rules. At the Hague and Geneva Conventions, these rules,
known as the law of the Hague and the law of Geneva, were codified and attempted to bring
discrimination, proportionality, and military necessity into belligerent calculations. On the
main corpus of jus in bello, see Convention Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on
Land, October 18, 1907, 36 Stat. 2277, T.S. No. 539, 1 Bevans 631 (known commonly as the
Hague Regulations); Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and
Sick in Armed Forces in the Field, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3114, T.I.A.S. No. 3362, 75
U.N.T.S. 31 [hereinafter Geneva Convention I]; Convention for the Amelioration of the Con-
dition of Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea, Aug. 12, 1949, 6
U.S.T. 3217, T.I.A.S. No. 3363, 75 U.N.T.S. 85 [hereinafter Geneva Convention II]; Conven-
tion Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, T.I.A.S.
No. 3364, 75 U.N.T.S. 135 [hereinafter Geneva Convention III]; Geneva Convention IV,
supra note 2.
6. It is important to note here that the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of
the Crime of Genocide, Dec. 9, 1948, 78 U.N.T.S. 277 [hereinafter Genocide Convention],
proscribes conduct that is juristically distinct from other forms of prohibited wartime kill-
ing-killing involving acts constituting crimes of war and crimes against humanity. Although
the term "crifies against humanity" is linked to wartime actions, the crime of genocide can be
committed during peacetime or during a war. "Whether committed in time of peace or in time
of war," under the Genocide Convention, "[tIhe Contracting Parties confirm that genocide
. . . is a crime under international law which they undertake to prevent and to punish." Id.,
art. 1.
7. This principle was reaffirmed by the Nuremberg Judgment in which the Tribunal
stated: "So far from it being unjust to punish him, it would be unjust if his wrong were al-
lowed to go unpunished." A.P. D'ENTREVES, NATURAL LAW: AN INTRODUCTION TO LEGAL
PHILOSOPHY 110 (1951). Such reaffirmation, however, was not a rejection of the corollary
principles of nullum crimen sine lege (no crime without a law) and nulla poena sine lege (no
punishment without a law), because the Judgment was founded entirely upon settled norms of
international law. The doctrine of nullum crimen sine poena can be abused when the definition
of crime is left to ad hoc determinations of the public authority such as in situations in which
punishment is based upon retroactive declarations of penal laws, or in which normative ambi-
guity makes it impossible to know in advance what conduct is criminal. Such abuse, however,
could not be an issue in the prosecution of Iraqi crimes because the definitions of crimes of
war, crimes against peace, and crimes against humanity-the categories of criminal conduct
that would form the indictment against Saddam Hussein et. al-are already fixed, clear, and
established.
8. Crimes of war, crimes against peace, and crimes against humanity are defined in the
London Charter, Aug. 8, 1945, art. 6(a), (b), (c), 59 Stat. 1544, 82 U.N.T.S. 279, as follows:
(a) Crimes against peace: namely, planning, preparation, initiation or waging of
a war of aggression, or a war in violation of international treaties, agreements or
assurances, or participation in a common plan or conspiracy for the accomplish-
ment of any of the foregoing;
(b) War crimes: namely, violations of the laws or customs of war. Such viola-
tions shall include but not be limited to, murder, ill-treatment or deportation to
slave labour or for any other purpose of civilian population of or in occupied
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questions of precedent, jurisdiction,9 and scope,10 not to mention
enormously complex questions of custody1" and criminal procedure. 2
territory, murder or ill-treatment of prisoners of war or persons on the seas,
killing of hostages, plunder of public or private property, wanton destruction of
cities, towns or villages, or devastation not justified by military necessity;
(c) Crimes against humanity: namely, murder, extermination, enslavement, de-
portation, and other inhumane acts committed against any civilian population,
before or during the war; or persecutions on political, racial or religious grounds
in execution of or in connection with any crime within the jurisdiction of the
Tribunal, whether or not in violation of the domestic law of the country where
perpetrated ....
Id.
See also London Agreement, supra note 4. Agreement for the Prosecution and Punishment of
the Major War Criminals of the European Axis Powers, August 8, 1945, Appendix, sec. 12,
art. 12, 59 Stat. 1544, 82 U.N.T.S. 279 [hereinafter London Charter].
9. In this connection, the following four traditionally recognized bases of jurisdiction
come to mind immediately: (1) the territorial principle, determining jurisdiction by reference
to the territory on which the crimes were committed; (2) the protective principle, determining
jurisdiction by reference to the national interest injured by the crimes; (3) the universality
principle, determining jurisdiction by reference to the custody of the person committing the
crimes; and (4) the passive personality piinciple, determining jurisdiction by reference to the
nationality of the persons injured by the crimes.
10. Just how broadly among the Iraqi armed forces and political leadership should the
prosecutorial net of criminal indictments be cast?
11. In view of the obvious difficulties surrounding actual custody of Saddam Hussein
and other likely Iraqi defendants, some trials may have to be conducted in absentia.
Nuremburg set some precedent in this area. According to the London Charter, supra note 8,
"The Tribunal shall have the right to take proceedings against a person charged with crimes
set out in Article 6 of this Charter [i.e., crimes against peace, war crimes, and crimes against
humanity] in his absence, if he has not been found or if the Tribunal, for any reason, finds it
necessary, in the interests of justice, to conduct the hearing in his absence." Id., art. 12.
Normally, however, trials in absentia may run counter to long-settled principles of justice
and due process in national and international law. In the United Nations Report of the 1953
Committee on International Criminal Jurisdiction (27 July - 20 Aug. 1953), the Committee
reaffirmed the general principle of law that an accused "should have the right to be present at
all stages of the proceedings." See Report of the Committee on Int'l Crim. Jurisdiction, 9
U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 12) art. 129, U.N. Doc. A/2645 (1954). In the Annex to the Report,
in the Committee's Revised Draft Statute for an International Criminal Court, the rights of
the accused to a "fair trial" include, inter alia, "The right to be present at all stages of the
proceedings." Id. at annex, art. 38(2)(a).
The European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Free-
doms, Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221, also stipulates that everyone charged with a criminal
offense has the right, inter alia, "to defend himself in person or through legal assistance of his
own choosing . I... Id , art. 6, 3(c). The same right is affirmed in the International Covenant
on Civil and Political Rights, G.A. Res. 2200, 21 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 16) at 52, U.N.
Doc. A/6316 (1966). Strictly speaking, of course, anyone charged with a criminal offense who
is offered representation "through legal assistance of his own choosing" - as an alternative to
defending himself in person - is being allowed essential minimum guarantees under law and
is not being deprived of due process by trials in absentia. Id. Similarly, anyone charged with a
criminal offense who is offered the opportunity "to defend himself in person", but declines to
do so, is normally not being mistreated under law. Amendments IV, V, VI, and VIII to the
United States Constitution comprise a "bill of rights" for accused persons. The phrase "due
process of law" derives from chapter 29 of the Magna Carta wherein the King promised that:
no man (nullus liber homo) be taken, imprisoned or put out of his free-hold or
his liberties of free customs, or outlawed or exiled, or in any manner destroyed,
nor shall we come upon him or send against him, except by a legal judgment of
his peers or by the law of the land (per legem terrae).
COKE, INSTITUTES, 50 (1669) (cited in CORWIN, THE CONSTITUTION AND WHAT IT MEANS
TODAY 217 (1963)).
12. For a comprehensive consideration of Iraqi war crimes and prosecutorial options,
refer to the following articles: Paust, Suing Saddam: Private Remedies for War Crimes and
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How should the coalition begin? Led by the United States,
which was also the dominant national force at Nuremberg, the part-
ners must create a specially constituted agency endowed-with organi-
zational form, centralized direction and expert legal counsel.13 Re-
sembling the war-crimes planning group fashioned in the War
Department after the allied defeat of the Third Reich, this agency
would be charged with the tasks of drafting basic documents, fram-
ing pertinent criminal indictments, and preparing courtroom
prosecutions.
There is not a moment to lose. Since coalition forces have al-
ready left Iraq, identification will be overwhelmingly difficult. Cus-
tody will require formal extradition requests to Baghdad and possi-
bly other Arab capitals.14 Such requests are not likely to be
honored.1
Hostage-Taking, 31:3 VA. J. INT'L L. 351 (1991); Beres, The United States Should Take the
Lead in Preparing International Legal Machinery for Prosecution of Iraqi Crimes, 31:3 VA. J.
INT'L L. 381 (1991); O'Brien, The Nuremberg Precedent and the Gulf War, 31:3 VA. J. INT'L
L. 391 (1991); and Moore, War Crimes and the Rule of Law in the Gulf Crisis, 31:3 VA. J.
INT'L L. (1991).
13. From the point of view of the United States, the Nuremberg obligations to bring
major Iraqi criminals to trial are, in a sense, doubly binding. This is because these obligations
represent both current obligations under international law and higher-law obligations found in
the American political tradition. By their codification of the principle that basic human rights
in war and in peace are now "peremptory," the Nuremberg obligations reflect a perfect con-
vergence between international law and the enduring foundation of our American Republic.
14. As such requests can be expected to fail, the requesting states may consider the
permissibility of abduction as the only means of securing custody. Normally, of course, there is
a presumption of sovereign immunity - a binding rule that exempts each state and its high
officials from the judicial jurisdiction of another state. In The Schooner Exchange v.
M'Faddon, Chief Justice Marshall argued for "the exemption of the person of the sovereign
from arrest or detention within a foreign territory." 11 U.S. 116, 137 (1812). Historically, the
rule of sovereign immunity may be traced to Roman Law and to the maxim of English law
that the King can do no wrong. Under current United States law, the authoritative expression
of this rule may be found in the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976, 23 U.S.C. §§
1602-1611 (1976).
15. In the nineteenth century, a principle of granting asylum to those whose crimes were
political was established in Europe and in Latin America. This principle is known as the politi-
cal offense exception to extradition. The political exception clause is included in many treaties.
The rationale of this clause is to ensure that the requirements of international and national
order are not met at the expense of national and international justice. Aware that all human
beings are entitled to certain essential rights under international law, and that particular states
are often indifferent or hostile to these rights, legal writers have' invoked the political offense
exception so that resistance to tyranny and oppression should not be impeded. At the same
time, to ensure that especially grievous crimes not be protected by the political offense excep-
tion, many treaties contain an exception to the exception for such crimes. For example, the
additional protocol to the Extradition Convention of 15 October 1975, excludes from the field
of application of the political offense exception, genocide, certain war crimes, and other crimes
against humanity. See ADDITIONAL PROTOCOL, E.T.S. No. 86. For a comprehensive assess-
ment of the political offense exception and of the associated doctrine of the "exception to the
exception," see 2 INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW, 414-18; 483-87 (M. Cherif Bassiouni, ed.
1986).
Under current international law, however, genocide and genocide-like crimes are specifi-
cally excluded from the realm of the political offense, and therefore, it is illegal to grant asy-
lum to alleged perpetrators of such crimes. See Convention of Genocide, supra note 6, art.
VII; Convention on the Non-Applicability of Statutory Limitations to War Crimes and Crimes
Against Humanity; Convention on the Non-Applicability of Statutory Limitations to War
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What, exactly, happened at Nuremberg? There, it was recog-
nized that belligerents have the right to punish, as war criminals,
those who violate the laws or customs of war. On November 1, 1943,
allied forces declared that: "atrocities, massacres and cold blooded
mass executions that were being perpetrated by the Hitlerite forces
." should be the object of criminal prosecution and punishment. 6
With this Moscow Declaration, the three allied powers (United
States, United Kingdom, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) an-
nounced that the "minor" Nazi war criminals would be tried and
punished within the lands where the crimes had taken place. As for
the major criminals "whose offenses had no particular geographical
location,"' 7 punishment was to be the product of joint allied
judgment.
Between October 1943 and January 1944, London and Wash-
ington established a United Nations Commission for the Investiga-
tion of War Crimes. 8 The commission, meeting in London during
1944, assembled lists of war criminals. On August 8, 1945, the con-
stitutive authority for an International Military Tribunal at Nurem-
berg was provided by the London Agreement and its accompanying
Charter." The law embodied in this Charter was "decisive and bind-
ing upon the Tribunal."20 It provided that:
The Tribunal . . . shall have the power to try and punish
persons who, acting in the interests of the European Axis coun-
tries, whether as individuals or as member of organizations,
committed any of the following crimes: (a) crimes against peace;
(b) crimes of war; (c) crimes against humanity.
21
Crimes and Crimes Against Humanity (1968) G.A. Res. 2391 (XXIII), 23 U.N. GAOR,
Supp. (No. 18) at 40, U.N. Doc. A/7218 (1968). In force on November 11, 1970, in accor-
dance with Article VIII; Principles of International Co-operation in the Detection, Arrest,
Extradition and Punishment of Persons Guilty of War Crimes and Crimes Against Humanity,
G.A. Res. 3074, 28 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 30), paras. 4, 7, U.N. Doc. A/9030 (1973);
Declaration on Territorial Asylum, G.A. Res. 2312, 22 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 16) at 1(2),
U.N. Doc. A/6716 (1967); International Convention on the Suppression and Punishment of
the Crime of Apartheid, G.A. Res. 3068, 28 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 30) art. 4(b), U.N. Doc.
A/9030 (1974). See also the provisions of the four Geneva Conventions stem from the maxim
aut dedere aut punire (i.e., either a State must extradite or make sure that a criminal is
punished in its own municipal court proceedings) Geneva Convention I, supra note 5, art. 49;
Geneva Convention II, supra note 5, art. 50; Geneva Convention III, supra note 5, art. 129;
Geneva Convention IV, supra note 2, art. 146. It follows that states that might grant Saddam
asylum (the usual candidates are Algeria, Tunisia, Yemen, Sudan, and Mauritania) would be
in grievous violation of binding international rules.
16. See Moscow Declaration, in 38 AM. J. INT'L L. 7 (Supp. 1944) and cited by Bas-
siouni, International Law and the Holocaust, 91 CAL. W. INT'L L.J. 201 (1979).
17. Id.
18. Commonly known as the United Nations War Crimes Commission (UNWCC).
19. See London Agreement, supra note 4; London Charter, supra note 4.
20. See International Military Tribunal, I Trial of the Major War Criminals Before the
International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg, Judgment 218 (Nov. 1, 1945 - Oct. 1, 1946)
published by the Secretariat of the Tribunal, Nuremberg 1947-1949 [hereinafter Trial I].
21. London Charter, supra note 4, art. 61.
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The 'results of the Nuremberg Trial of the Major War
Criminals are now well-known. Among other things, the Tribunal
explicitly rejected the idea that only states are subjects of interna-
tional law and declared authoritatively that "individuals" are pun-
ishable for crimes against international law.22 As a practical matter,
Germany had surrendered unconditionally, and the allies did not en-
counter any legal problems in gaining custody over the major Nazi
criminals.2 3
How comparable, then, is Nuremberg to the current situation
concerning Iraqi crimes? Unlike Germany, Iraq emerged from war
unoccupied. Thus, it is essentially impossible that a Nuremberg-style
tribunal could be convened within Iraq or that custody over Iraqi
criminals could be established without resort to forcible abductions.
Nevertheless, the Principles of Nuremberg, formulated by the Inter-
national Law Commission (ILC) and adopted by the United Nations
General Assembly in 1950, are fully binding upon all states and
compel prosecution of-Iraqi crimes against peace, crimes of war, and
crimes against humanity.
Exactly what kinds of Iraqi crimes are involved?24 Judging from
persistent and well-documented reports, the crimes are so terrible in
law that they mandate universal cooperation in apprehension and
punishment,25 crimen contra omnes (crimes against all). They in-
22. According to the Judgment, "Crimes against international law are committed by
men, not by abstract entities, and only by punishing individuals who commit such crimes can
the provisions of international law be enforced." See Trial I, supra note 20, at 223.
23. Twenty-four individuals were named in the indictment as defendants; defendant Ley
committed suicide prior to the trial, and defendant Krupp was found unfit to stand trial, leav-
ing twenty-two defendants.
24. For documentation of Iraqi crimes, see Iraqi Forces Killings and Torturing in Ku-
wait, Says Amnesty. International Fact-Finding Team, Amnesty Int'l News Release, Al index
MDE 14/15/90, Distr. SC/PO (Oct. 3, 1990) (preliminary report on widespread charges of
Iraqi torture, willful killing, rape, pillage, and collective reprisals). See also Iraq/Occupied
Kuwait Human Rights Violations Since 2 August 1990, Dec. 19, 1990, at Al index MDE 14/
16/90. For personal testimonies of Iraqi brutalities, see N.Y. Times, Jan. 14, 1991, at A17,
col. 1; Ghabra, The Iraqi Occupation of Kuwait: An Eyewitness Account, 20 J. PALESTINE
STUD. 112 (1991). Further documentation can be found in STAFF OF SENATE COMM. ON FOR-
EIGN RELATIONS, 102d Cong., 1st Sess., CIVIL WAR IN IRAQ (Comm. Print 1991) (findings of
Peter W. Galbraith); Crisis in the Persian Gulf: Sanctions, Diplomacy and War: Hearings
Before the House Comm. on Armed Services, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. (1990); Human Rights
Abuses in Kuwait and Iraq: Hearings Before the House Comm. on Foreign Affairs, 102d
Cong., 1st Sess. (1991).
25. The principle of universality is founded upon the presumption of solidarity between
states in the fight against crimes. It is mentioned in the Corpus Juris Civilis, cited in GROTIUS,
2 DE JURE BELLI AC PACIS (1964), and in I VATTEL, LE DROIT DES GENS (1964). The case for
universal jurisdiction - which is strengthened wherever extradition is difficult or impossible to
obtain - is also built into the four Geneva Conventions of August 12, 1949, which unambigu-
ously impose upon the High Contracting Parties the obligation to punish certain grave
breaches of their rules, regardless of where the infraction was committed or the nationality of
the authors of the crimes. See Article 49 of Convention No. 1; Article 50 of Convention No. 2;
Article 129 of Convention No. 3; and Article 146 of Convention No. 4. In further support of
universality for certain international crimes, see BASSIOUNI. 2 INTERNATIONAL EXTRADITION
IN U.S. LAW AND PRACTICE (1983). See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND/THIRD) OF THE FOR-
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clude the following: (1) barbarous and inhuman assaults against
Kuwaiti and other nationals in' Kuwait; (2) barbarous and inhuman
treatment of coalition prisoners of war in Iraq and Kuwait; and (3)
aggression and crimes of war against noncombatant populations in
Israel2" and Saudi Arabia. 27 All of these "grave breaches" under in-
ternational law are in addition to the original crimes against peace
8
committed against Kuwait on August 2, 1990.29 The United States
EIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES, §§ 402-404, 443 (Tent. Draft No. 5, 1984), 18
U.S.C. § (6)(c).
26. Iraq had been an aggressor against. Israel from the start. Baghdad sent significant
numbers of expeditionary forces in the 1948 War of Independence, the Six Day War (1967),
and the Yom Kippur War (1973). During the 1948 War, Iraqi forces entered Trans-Jordan
and engaged Israeli forces in Western Samaria. In the aftermath of the 1967 War Iraqi forces,
which were again deployed in Jordan, remained there for more than two years. During the
1973 War, Baghdad committed about one-third of its then 95,000 man armed forces to assist
Syria in its campaign against the IDF on the Golan Heights.
27. We must also add here Iraq's commission of new forms of environmental destruction
and environmental manipulation as a form of warfare. The intentional dumping of millions of
barrels of Kuwaiti and Saudi oil into the Gulf and the torching of Kuwaiti oil wells represent
clear and egregious violations of Article 53 of Geneva Convention IV, supra note 2. See also
Convention on the Prohibition of Military or Any Other Hostile Use of Environmental Modifi-
cation Techniques, Dec. 10, 1976, 31 U.S.T. 333, T.I.A.S. No. 9614, 16 I.L.M. 88. Regarding
Saddam Hussein's "eco-terrorism" against Kuwaiti oil wells, a number of pertinent instru-
ments pertain to marine pollution. See International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution
of the Sea by Oil, May 12, 1954, 12 U.S.T. 2989, T.I.A.S. No. 4900, 327 U.N.T.S. 3. See
also International Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damage, Nov. 19, 1969, 9
I.L.M. 45 (1970); International Convention on the Establishment of an International Fund for
Compensation for Oil Pollution Damage, Dec. 18, 1971, 11 I.L.M. 284 (1972); Convention for
the Prevention of Marine Pollution from Land Based Sources, June 4, 1974, 13 I.L.M. 352
(1974); Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damage Resulting from the Explora-
tion and Exploitation of the Seabed Mineral Resources, Apr. 30, 1978. Other pertinent con-
ventions are the following: International Convention Relating to Intervention on the High Seas
in Cases of Oil Pollution Casualties; International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution
from Ships; and Protocol of 1978 Relating to the International Convention for the Prevention
of Pollution from Ships, 1973; and Convention on the Prevention of Marine Pollution by
Dumping of Wastes and Other Matter, Dec. 29, 1972, 1972, 26 U.S.T. 2403, T.I.A.S. No.
8165, reprinted in I.L.M. 1294 (1972).
28. Pursuant to the London Agreement, supra note 1, the indictment of the Interna-
tional Military Tribunal contained two counts concerning crimes against peace and was
founded on the Kellogg-Briand Pact, the Stimson Note of 1932, the Geneva Protocols and the
Resolutions of the Eighth Assembly of the League of Nations and the Sixth International
Conference of American States. Moreover, the Weimar Constitution had stated that "gener-
ally accepted rules of international law" were part of German law and that the outlawry of
aggressive war had been one of the "generally accepted rules of international law" in 1939.
See BROWNLIE, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE USE OF FORCE By STATES 55-65 (1963).
29. For crimes against peace or waging aggressive war, see Resolution on the Definition
of Aggression, G.A. Res. 3314, 29 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 31) at 142, U.N. Doc. A/9631
(1975). For pertinent codifications of the criminalization of aggression, see Treaty Providing
for the Renunciation of War as an Instrument of National Policy, Aug. 27, 1928, 46 Stat.
2343, T.S. No. 796, 94 U.N.T.S. 57; U.N. CHARTER, art. 2, para. 4; Declaration on the Inad-
missibility of Intervention in the Domestic Affairs of States and the Protection of Their Inde-
pendence and Sovereignty, G.A. Res. 2131, 20 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 14) at 11, U.N. Doc.
A/6014 (1966), reprinted in 5 I.L.M. 374; Declaration on Principles of International Law
Concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation Among States in Accordance with the Char-
ter of the United Nations, G.A. Res. 2625, 25 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 28) at 121, U.N. Doc.
A/8028 (1971); Declaration on the Non-use of Force in International Relations and Perma-
nent Prohibition on the Use of Nuclear Weapons, G.A. Res. 2936, 27 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No.
30) at 5, U.N. Doc. A/8730 (1972); London Charter, supra note 4, art. 6. Resolution Af-
firming the Principles of International Law Recognized by the Charter of the Nuremberg
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and all other states bound by the 1949 Geneva Conventions are obli-
gated under international law to search out and prosecute or extra-
dite individuals alleged to have committed "grave breaches" of these
Conventions. According to Article 146 of the Fourth Geneva Con-
vention (Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of
War):
Each High Contracting Party shall be under the obligation
to search for persons alleged to have committed, or to have or-
dered to be committed, such grave breaches, and shall bring
such persons, regardless of their nationality, before its own
courts. It may also, if it prefers, and in accordance with the pro-
visions of its own legislation, hand such persons over for trial to
another High Contracting Party concerned, provided such High
Contracting Party has made out a prima facie case.3
Interestingly, Israel and Saudi Arabia would be on very firm
jurisprudential ground if they chose to initiate their own legal pro-
ceedings. Afflicted by multiple acts of aggression, 31 both Saudi Ara-
bia and Israel could establish jurisdiction over Saddam Hussein, et
al, within their own courts based upon not only their particular vic-
timization, but also upon universal jurisdiction. However, because a
state of war continues to exist between Israel and every Arab State
except Egypt, 32 Israel's leaders would be entirely reasonable in not
Tribunal, G.A. Res. 95, 1 U.N. GAOR at 1144, U.N. Doc. A/236 (1946). See also Conven-
tion on the Rights and Duties of States, Dec. 26, 1933, arts. 8, 10, 11, 49 Stat. 3097, T.S. No.
881, 165 U.N.T.S. 19 (generally known as the "Montevideo Convention"); Pact of the League
of Arab States, March 22, 1945, art. 5, 70 U.N.T.S. 237; Charter of the Organization of
American States, April 30, 1948, chs. II, IV, V, 2 U.S.T. 2394, T.I.A.S. No. 2361, 119
U.N.T.S. 3; the Protocol of Amendment, Feb. 27, 1967, 21 U.S.T. 607, T.I.A.S. No. 6847
(generally known as the "Protocol of Buenos Aires"); Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal
Assistance, Sept. 2, 1947, 62 Stat. 1681., T.I.A.S. No. 1838, 121 U.N.T.S. 77 (known gener-
ally as the "Rio Pact"); American Treaty on Pacific Settlement, April 30, 1948, 30 U.N.T.S.
55 (generally known as the "Pact of Bogota"); Charter of the Organization of African Unity,
May 25, 1963, arts. 11, III, 479 U.N.T.S. 39.
30. See Geneva Convention IV, supra note 2, art. 146; 3 U.N. Docs. S/RES/670, S
RES/674 (1990).
31. For more on aggression, see Draft Code of Crimes Against the Peace & Security of
Mankind, [1954] 2 Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N 150, U.N. Doc. A/2693 (This was revised in 1987,
1988, and 1989.). See also U.N. Doc. A/42/420 (1987), U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/404 (1987),
U.N. Doc. A/43/539 (1988), U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/419 (1989), and U.N. Doc. A/44/150
(1989). See also Declaration on the Right of Peoples to Peace, G.A. Res. 39/11 Annex, 39
U.N. GAOR Annex 39/11 (No. 51) at 22, U.N. Doc. A/39/L.14 (1984).
32. The agreements that put an end to the first Arab-Israeli War (1947-1949) were
general armistice agreements negotiated bilaterally between Israel and Egypt on February 24,
1949, 42 U.N.T.S. 251-70 (1949); Israel and Lebanon on March 23, 1949, 42 U.N.T.S. 287-
98 (1949); Israel and Jordan on April 3, 1949, 42 U.N.T.S. 303-20 (1949); and between Israel
and Syria on July 20, 1949, 42 U.N.T.S. 327-40 (1949).
Pursuant to these agreements, the Security Council, on August 11, 1949, issued a Resolu-
tion which, inter alia, "noted with satisfaction the several Armistice Agreements," and "Finds
that the Armistice Agreements constitute an important step toward the establishment of per-
manent peace in Palestine and considers that these agreements supersede the truce provided
for in Security Council resolution 50 (1948) of May 29, 1948, and Security Council Resolu-
tion 54 (1948) of July 15, 1948. See Resolution Noting the Armistice Agreements and Reaf-
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expecting co-operation from other states in the Middle East in prose-
cuting Iraqi crimes.33
Whether Israel chose to base its jurisdiction over Iraqi crimes
on territoriality or universality principles, it would have to make an-
other far more serious decision: Should prosecution take the form of
in absentia trials, or should Saddam and others be brought to Israeli
courts by abduction? At first glance, the second course is far more
problematic jurisprudentially, but it is also potentially far more con-
sequential as a pragmatic path toward real justice. Guided by the
expectations of nullem crimen sine poena (no crime without a pun-
ishment), Israel would be moving more expeditiously toward actual
punishment by opting for abduction over trials in absentia.
firming the Order to Observe an Unconditional Cease Fire Pending a Final Peace Settlement,
S.C. Res. 73, 4 U.N. SCOR, 1949, at 8, U.N. Doc. S/1376, (1949). With the exception of
Egypt, none of the aforelisted armistice agreements has been superseded by an authentic peace
treaty. A general armistice is a war convention, an agreement or contract concluded between
belligerents. Such an agreement does not result in the termination of a state of war.
The 1907 Hague Convention'IV Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land stip-
ulates that "[a]n armistice suspends military operations by mutual agreement between the
belligerent parties." Convention No. IV Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land,
Oct. 18, 1907, annex, ch. 5, art. 36, 36 Stat. 2277, T.S. No. 539 (emphasis added). The courts
of individual states have also affirmed the principle that an armistice does not end a war. See,
e.g., Kahn v. Anderson, 255 U.S. 1 (1921). Indeed, throughout history, armistices have nor-
mally envisaged a resumption of hostilities. It follows from this that since no peace treaties
have been concluded between Israel and the Arab states with which it negotiated armistice
agreements in 1949 (again, with the prominent exception of Egypt), a condition of belligerency
continues to exist between these states and Israel. For pertinent documents and commentary
on Israel-Arab agreements, See R. HIGGINS, UNITED NATIONS PEACEKEEPING 1946-1967:
THE MIDDLE EAST (1969), which is a study issued under the auspices of the Royal Institute of
International Affairs). For pertinent commentary and documents on the historic status of rela-
tions between the Arab states and Israel, see T.N. DuPuY ELUSIVE VICTORY: THE ARAB-IS-
RAELI WARS, 1947-1974 (1978), (especially Chapter 12).
33. At the conclusion of the recent Gulf War, the Bush administration announced plans
to sell to Saudi Arabia, a country of six million inhabitants, an arms package of $24 billion
which includes over 500 tanks, forty-eight F-15 fighter planes, Apache helicopter gunships,
more than thirty Patriot batteries, tens of thousands armored vehicles, multiple rocket-launch-
ers and command/control systems. Rationalizing the Saudi demand for this vast arsenal by
pointing to the "growing danger from Iran," the Bush administration ignores that such Ameri-
can arms can be used for aggression against Israel. Indeed, while a Saudi Arabia that joined in
the coalition to defeat Saddam now appears benign, this monarchy has-been busily compensat-
ing the Assad regime in Syria with billions of dollars in aid - money to be used entirely for
Syria's ongoing military buildup. Egypt, in addition to acquiring substantial military assets
from the United States, is developing its own home-grown missile, the Saqr-80 (which can be
launched from FROG-7 launchers), while Iran is deploying its domestically-produced Oghab
missile. For more on Arab and Iranian militarization, see Heller, Coping with Missile
Proliferation in the Middle East, 35 ORBIS 15-28 (1991).
From May to October 1991, Pakistan has received new M-I 1 missiles from China; Brazil
may have concluded a secret deal with the Libyan Air Force to provide technical assistance to
service Libyan warplanes; China entered into a reactor project with Algeria that may well
have nuclear-weapon related implications; China exported missile or nuclear-weapons related
technology to Egypt, Algeria, Libya, Syria, Saudi Arabia, Iran, and Pakistan; Iran tested a
modified version of the Soviet SCUD-C intermediate range ballistic missile and has reportedly
spent, since March 1990, at least $200 million annually on a nuclear weapons program aided
by Pakistan, Argentina, and China; and Libya has negotiated with North Korea for the
purchase of a new IRBM system. See PROLIFERATION WATCH, U.S. Senate Committee on
Governmental Affairs 12 (May-June 1991).
INTERNATIONAL LAW
Upon closer examination, Jerusalem would discover that abduc-
tion of a "common enemy of mankind" such as Saddam is not nearly
as problematic in law as one might think. It would also discover that
abduction could involve very considerable tactical (military) difficul-
ties that might be exceedingly costly to overcome. Indeed, these diffi-
culties could create substantial harm to civilians in Iraq, causing
death, injury, and destruction that could undermine the operation's
rationale as a law-enforcing measure.
Yet, if the tactical problems could be handled without causing
collateral harms in Iraq, the abduction of Saddam Hussein, et al, for
trial in Israel could be defended persuasively under international
law.34 Recognizing that the only practical alternative to such a strat-
egy would likely leave monumental crimes unpunished, Israel's lead-
ers would be justified in going outside the usual mechanisms of ex-
tradition. To secure custody would be more lawful than leaving this
hostes hurnani generis free to commit further crimes of war, crimes
against peace, and crimes against humanity. This argument, how-
ever, would be contingent upon the presumption that ordinary mech-
anisms of extradition were inoperative, but such a presumption is
entirely plausible.
Washington and its allies also must decide on how broadly they
wish to prosecute Iraqi crimes. In this respect, the special post
World War II war crimes planning group had a somewhat easier
task. It focused primarily on particular Nazi groups that were de-
fined as inherently criminal (i.e., the SS and the Gestapo). Following
the recent defeat of Saddam Hussein, however, it appears that many
of the crimes against humanity committed by Iraq were unplanned
and individually-conceived atrocities.3 5 This means that coalition
34. On the principle of command responsibility, or respondeat superior, see In re
Yamashita, 327 U.S. 1 (1945); The High Command Case (The Trial of Wilhelm von Leeb)
12 LAw REPORTS OF TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS 1, 71 (United Nations War Crimes Commis-
sion Comp. 1949); see Parks, Command Responsibility for War Crimes, 62 MIL. L. REV. 1
(1973); O'Brien, The Law of War, Command Responsibility and Vietnam, 60 GEO. L.J. 605
(1972); U.S. DEPT. OF THE ARMY, ARMY SUBJECT SCHEDULE No. 27-1 (Geneva Conventions
of 1949 and Hauge Convention No. IV of 1907) 10 (1970). The direct individual responsibility
of Saddam Hussein and others is unambiguous in view of the London Agreement, supra note
4, art. 7 which denies defendants the protection of the act of state defense. Under traditional
international law, violations of international law were the responsibility of the state, as a cor-
porate actor, not the individual human decision-makers in government and in the military.
35. This does not mean, however, that if these crimes were planned and directed by
Iraqi military authorities, individual soldiers could plead "superior orders" in their defense.
With respect to the issue of superior orders, the classical writers on international law had long
rejected that doctrine as a proper defense against the charge of war crimes. The German Code
of Military Law operative during the war provided that a soldier must execute all orders un-
deterred by the fear of legal consequences, but it added that this would not excuse him in cases
where he must have known with certainty that the order was illegal. This view was upheld in
an important decision of the German Supreme Court in Leipzig in 1921. According to the
Court, a subordinate who obeyed the order of a superior officer was liable to punishment if it
was known to him that such an order involved a contravention of international law. The
London Charter, supra note 4, which established jurisdiction and authority for the Nuremberg
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lists of suspected war criminals could become so large as to be alto-
gether unmanageable. Alternatively, coalition prosecution could fo-
cus essentially on Saddam and his leadership elite. Such a judicial
strategy would permit many or all rank-and-file Iraqi criminals to
avoid punishment, but would at least stand some chance of far-
reaching and practical success.
3 6
Regarding breadth of prosecutorial concern, the United States
and its partners also must decide whether or not to include Iraq's
multiple and long-term crimes against its own Kurdish populations.
During 1987 and 1988, Baghdad undertook a campaign of destruc-
tion of Kurdish villages, and the relocation of large numbers of
Kurds to selected areas of Iraq. In 1988 after the Iran-Iraq war en-
ded, the Iraqi air force launched massive chemical attacks on Kurd-
ish villages.
3 7
After the Gulf War, in March 1991 Iraq's Kurds were once
again the targets of genocidal assaults by Saddam Hussein's regime.
In northern and southern Iraq, forces loyal to Saddam Hussein shel-
led cities intensely, leveled entire neighborhoods, and engaged in
wholesale massacres of Kurdish civilians. According to a report is-
sued by the Committee on Foreign Relations of the United States
Senate: "More than two million Iraqi Kurds have sought refuge on
Tribunal, observed in Articles 7 and 8 that "superior orders" were not to be considered by the
Tribunal as freeing defendants from responsibility. Id. arts. 7, 8. It is stated that:
The very essence of the Charter is that individuals have international duties
which transcend the national obligations of obedience imposed by the individual
State. He who violates the laws of war cannot obtain immunity while acting in
pursuance of the authority of the State if the State in authorizing action moves
outside its competence under international law.
Id. This principle was reaffirmed in 1950 when the United Nations International Law Com-
mission, pursuant to G.A. Res. 177, 2 U.N. GAOR -, U.N. Doc. A/ - (1947) (by a
vote of 42 to I, with 8 abstentions) formulated the Principles of International Law Recognized
in the Charter and Judgment of the Nuremberg Tribunal. According to Principle IV: "The
fact that a person acted pursuant to order of his Government or of a superior does not relieve
him from responsibility under international law." Id.
36. The liability of Saddam and his ruling associates for crimes committed under inter-
national law is well established in the principle of respondeat superior. Literally "let the
master answer," this principle is the converse of the doctrine of "superior orders," and is
designed to ensure that obedience to authority by subordinates entails no criminal conse-
quences. DEPT. OF THE ARMY, THE LAW OF LAND WARFARE, FIELD MANUAL 27-10 (1956).
Moreover, the superior's responsibility extends to situations even where no affirmative orders to
commit crimes have been given. Id. Based on the judgment over Japanese General Tomayuki
Yamashita, it is stipulated that any commander who had actual knowledge, or should have
had knowledge, that troops or other persons under his control were complicit in war crimes and
failed to take necessary steps to protect the laws of war was guilty of a war crime. Id., para.
510. Paragraph 510 denies the defense of "act of state" to such alleged criminals by providing
that, though a person who committed an act constituting an international crime may have
acted as head of state or as a responsible government official, he is not relieved, thereby, from
responsibility for that act. This paragraph, of course, is drawn from Principle III of Principles
of International Law Recognized in the Charter of the Nuremberg Tribunal and in the Judg-
ment of the Tribunal (1946; known commonly as "The Nuremberg Principles") and in the
formulation of these principles by the International Law Commission (1950).
37. STAFF OF SENATE COMM. ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, 102d Cong., 1st Sess., CIVIL
WAR IN IRAQ 102-127 (Comm. Print 1991).
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the Iraq-Turkey and the Iraq-Iran borders and they are dying at a
rate of up to 2,000 a day."38 In the words of Peter W. Galbraith,
author of- the -report:
My visit to liberated Kurdistan, over the weekend of March
30-31, coincided with the collapse of the Kurdish rebellion and
the beginning of the humanitarian catastrophe now overwhelm-
ing the Kurdish people. I was an eyewitness to many of the
atrocities being committed by the Iraqi army, including the
heavy shelling of cities, the use of phosphorous artillery shells,
and the creation of tens of thousands of refugees. From Kurdish
leaders and refugees I heard firsthand accounts of other horrors
including mass executions and the levelling of large sections of
Kurdish cities. 9
Significantly, these crimes continue well up to the present mo-
ment.40 At the time of this writing, in mid-October 1991, Iraq is
launching large ground and air attacks against Kurdish towns in
northern Iraq. An unofficial cease-fire had been in effect for five
months. In this connection, the entire pattern of Iraqi crimes against
the Kurds is clearly not a matter of domestic jurisdiction: it is a
matter of international concern.
It should be noted that a coalition agency charged with creating
"another Nuremberg" could adopt the solution favored by the
United States (U.S.), the former Soviet Union (U.S.S.R.), the
United Kingdom (U.K.), and France in 1945. Here, a specially-cre-
ated tribunal would be established for the trial of major criminals
(Saddam Hussein and the surviving members of his Revolutionary
Council), while the domestic courts of individual coalition countries
would provide the venue for trials of "minor" criminals (of ordinary
Iraqi soldiers and their civilian Iraqi collaborators). As in the dis-
tinction employed to prosecute Nazi offenses, the separation of "ma-
jor" and "minor" criminals concerns matters of rank or position, not
the seriousness or horror of particular transgressions. Moreover, be-
cause the Iraqi crimes make their perpetrators "common enemies of
mankind" under international law, every country now has the legal
38. See id.
39. See id.
40. Regarding the criminal iesponsibility of the individual Iraqi perpetrators of these
crimes, the principle is well-established that orders pursuant to domestic law are no defense to
violations of international law. See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, art. 27, U.N.
Conference on Law of Treaties, Doc. A/CONF. 39/27, May 23, 1969, reprinted in 8 I.L.M.
679 (1969); Free Zones of Upper Savoy and the District of Gex (Fr. v. Switz.), 1932 P.C.I.J.
(ser. A/B), No. 46, at 167; Treatment of Polish Nationals in Danzig (parties abbreviated),
1932 P.C.I.J. (seT. A/B), No. 46, at 24; see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF THE FOREIGN
RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 3.2 (collected in Legal Advisor, U.S. Dept. of
State, Memorandum on the Application of International Law to Iranian Exchange Regula-
tions (Feb. 15, 1984), reprinted in 130 CONG. REC. S. 1679, 1682 (1984).
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right to prosecute these crimes in its own courts.41
From a strictly jurisprudential point of view, crimes of war,
crimes against peace, and crimes against humanity are offenses
against humankind over which there is universal jurisdiction and a
universal obligation to prosecute.42 But for many complementary
reasons, it is the United States that should now take the lead in pros-
ecution of major Iraqi criminals. These reasons include the special
U.S. role in military operations supporting the pertinent Security
Council resolutions,43 the historic U.S. role at Nuremberg in 1945,
and the long history of US acceptance of jurisdictional competence
and responsibility on behalf of international law.
As noted by the Sixth Circuit in 1985, Demjanjuk v. Petrov-
sky:44 "The law of the United States includes international law" and
"international law recognizes 'universal jurisdiction' over certain of-
fenses."' Article VI of the U.S. Constitution and a number of court
decisions make all international law, conventional and customary,
the supreme law of the land.46 The Nuremberg Tribunal itself ac-
knowledged that the participating powers "have done together what
any one of them might have done singly."
'47
41. A contemporary example is that of Israel. Recognizing that genociders are common
enemies of mankind and that no authoritative central institutions exist to apprehend such out-
laws or to judge them as a penal tribunal, Israel sought to uphold the antigenocide norms of
international law in its trial of Adolf Eichmann, a Nazi functionary of German or Austrian
nationality. Indicted under Israel's Nazi Collaborators Punishment Law, Eichmann was con-
victed and executed after the judgment was affirmed by the Supreme Court of Israel in 1962.
See 36 INT'L. L. REP. 5 (Israel, Dist. Ct. Jerusalem 1961). Affirmed Israel Supreme Court, 36
INT'L. L. REV. 277 (1962). Genocide is a crime against humanity with a precise jurisprudential
meaning. It identifies as criminal any of a series of stipulated acts "committed with intent to
destroy, in whole or part, a national, ethnic, racial, or religious group as such . Genocide
Convention, supra note 6.
42. Any indictments setting forth criminal charges against Saddam Hussein and other
unnamed defendants must identify violations, inter alia, of the following three authoritative
codifications: Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel Inhuman or Degrading Treatment
or Punishment, G.A. Res. 39/46 Annex, 39 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 51) at 197, U.N. Doc.
E/CN.4/1984/72 (1984), reprinted in 23 I.L.M. 1027 (1984); International Convention
Against the Taking of Hostages, June 4, 1983, G.A. Res. 34/146, 34 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No.
46) at 245, U.N. Doc. A/34/786 (1979), reprinted in 18 I.L.M. 1456 (1979); Resolution on
Disappeared Persons, G.A. Res. 173, 33 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 45) at 158, U.N. Doc. A/
33/509 (1978).
43. For a comprehensive compilation of authoritative documents pertaining to the Gulf
War, see Current Documents: Gulf War Legal and Diplomatic Documents, Hous. J. INT'L L.
281-314 (1991).
44. See Demjanjuk v. Petrovsky, 716 F.2d 582-3 (6th cir. 1985).
45. Id.
46. "[AII treaties made . . . under the Authority of the United States, shall be the
supreme Law of the Land .... " U.S. CONST. art. 6. Moreover, although Article 6 refers
exclusively to treaties, the process of incorporation has also been implemented by the decision
of the U.S. Supreme Court in The Paquete Habana 175 U.S. 677 (1900) with respect to
customary international law. In United States v. Belmont, 301 U.S. 324 (1937) and in United
States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203 (1942), the Court held that other types of international agree-
ments concluded by the United States Government that have not received the formal advice
and consent of the Senate are nonetheless under the protection of the "Supremacy Clause."
47. Affirmation of the Principles of International Law Recognized by the Charter of
Nuremberg Tribunal (1946) was followed by General Assembly Resolution 177 (II), adopted
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Finally, in exercising its special responsibilities under interna-
tional and municipal law concerning prosecution of egregious Iraqi
crimes, the-United States already has the-competence to prosecute in
its own federal district courts. Requisite authority can be found at
Sections 818 and 821 of Title 10 of the United States Code (U.S.C.)
(which form part of an extraterritorial statutory scheme) and at Sec-
tion 3231 of Title 18 U.S.C. Thus, legal machinery for bringing Sad-
dam Hussein and his fellow criminals to justice is already well estab-
lished under international and United States law. All that is needed
is the political will to make this machinery work."
III. Conclusion
Although Nazi crimes were altogether unique and unprece-
dented in terms of scale and systematization, the crimes committed
by Iraq are essentially similar to those defined and prosecuted at
Nuremberg. 9 These crimes, therefore, warrant appropriate forms of
trial and punishment. 50 Failure by the international community, es-
November 21, 1947, directing the U.N. International Law Commission to "(a) Formulate the
principles of international law recognized in the Charter of the Nuremberg Tribunal and in
the judgment of the Tribunal and (b) Prepare a draft code of offenses against the peace and
security of mankind. ... U.N. Doc. A/519 at 112 (1947). The principles formulated are
known as the Principles of International Law Recognized in the Charter and Judgment of the
Nuremberg Tribunal, Report of the International Law Commission, U.N. GAOR Supp. (no.
12) at II, U.N. Doc. A/1316, at 11 (1950).
48. At the conclusion of the Gulf War, President Bush affirmed the proposition that
Saddam Hussein et al were responsible for numerous violations of international law: "And this
I promise you. For all that Saddam has done to his own people, to the Kuwaitis and to the
entire world, Saddam and those around him are accountable." President Bush's Address to
Joint Session of Congress, reprinted in Washington Post, Mar. 7, 1991, at A 32, col. 3.
49. This does not mean, however, that the creation of appropriate tribunals would be
contingent upon Iraqi crimes being authentic instances of genocide as defined at the Genocide
Convention. Rather, such creation would still be consistent with related "genocide-like" crimes
- crimes that may derive from multiple other sources of international law. See especially
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217 A (III), U.N. Doc. A/810, at 71
(1948); European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Free-
doms, Nov. 4, 1950, Europe T.S. No. 5, Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, July
28, 1951, 189 U.N.T.S. 137. (This Convention should be read in conjunction with the Protocol
Relating to the Status of Refugees, 19 U.S.T. 6223, T.I.A.S. No. 6577, 606 U.N.T.S. 267).
See also Convention on the Political Rights of Women, March 31, 1953, 27 U.S.T. 1909,
T.I.A.S. No. 8289, 193 U.N.T.S. 135; Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colo-
nial Countries and Peoples, G.A. Res. 1514, 15 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 16) at 66, U.N. Doc.
A/4684 (1961); International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimi-
nation, opened for signature, March 7, 1966, 660 U.N.T.S. 195, reprinted in 5 I.L.M. 352
(1966); International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, G.A. Res. 2200, 21
U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 16) at 49, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1967), reprinted in 6 I.L.M. 360
(1967); International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, G.A. Res. 2200, 21 U.N. GAOR
Supp. (No. 16) at 52, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1967), reprinted in I.L.M. 368 (1967); American
Convention on Human Rights, Nov. 22, 1969, entered into force, July 18, 1978, O.A.S. Treaty
Series No. 36 at 1, O.A.S. Off. Rec. OEA/Ser. L/V/II. 23 doc. 21 rev. 6 (1979), reprinted in
9 I.L.M. 673 (1970). The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, The International Cove-
nant on Civil and Political Rights (together with its Optional Protocol of 1976), and the Inter-
national Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights-known collectively as the Inter-
national Bill of Rights-serve as the touchstone for the normative protection of human rights.
50. In terms of the possibility of using domestic courts to uphold international law, the
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pecially the United States and its coalition partners,5" to establish
the necessary legal machinery 52 would be intrinsically unjust and
could contribute to future instances of international criminality.
Throughout the history of political philosophy and jurispruden-
tial thought, we discover two basic justifications of punishment:53 (1)
the retributive view that punishment is needed because the person
who does wrong should suffer as a consequence, usually in proportion
example of the United States may be of particular interest. Since its founding, the United
States has reserved the right to enforce international law within its own courts. Article I,
Section 8, Clause 10 of the American Constitution confers on Congress the power "to define
and punish piracies and felonies committed on the high seas, and offenses against the law of
nations." Pursuant to this Constitutional prerogative, the first Congress, in 1789, passed the
Alien Tort Statute. This statute authorizes United States Federal Courts to hear those civil
claims by aliens alleging acts committed "in violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the
United States" when the alleged wrongdoers can be found within the United States. At that
time, of course, the particular target of this legislation was piracy on the high seas.
Over the years, United States federal courts have rarely invoked the "law of nations," and
then only in such cases where the act in question had already been proscribed by treaties or
conventions. In 1979 a case seeking damages for foreign acts of torture was filed in United
States federal court. In a complaint filed jointly with his daughter, Dr. Joel Filartiga, a well-
known Paraguayan physician and artist and an opponent of President Alfredo Stroessner's
repressive regime, alleged that members of that regime's police force had tortured and mur-
dered his son, Joelito. On June 30, 1980, the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit found
that since an international consensus condemning torture had crystallized, torture violates the
"law of nations" for purposes of the Alien Tort Statute. Therefore, United States court have
jurisdiction under the statute to hear civil Suits by the victims of foreign torture, if the alleged
international outlaws are found in the United States. See The Alien Tort Claims Act 28
U.S.C. § 1350 (1982). The statute was enacted as part of the first Judiciary Act of 1789, I
Stat. 73, 77 (1848). See also the 1980 U.S. Federal appellate case of Filartiga v. Pefia-Irala,
630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980). There is an ironic dichotomy in U.S. law here. In Filartiga v.
Pefia-Irala, the Second Circuit held that 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (The Alien Tort Claims Act) pro-
vides a basis for aliens to bring actions in U.S. federal court for torts committed in violation of
the law of nations. Yet, a district court's holding in another recent case, Handel v. Artukovic,
means that United States citizens lack the private right to sue for violations of the law of
nations. Thus, U.S. federal courts appear to have jurisdiction to hear the clairfis of aliens more
readily than they do the claims of United States citizens. See Handel v. Artukovic, 601 F.
Supp. 1421 (1985). In this case, plaintiffs, United States citizens, brought a class action seek-
ing compensatory and punitive damages against defendant for his alleged involvement in the
deprivations of life and property suffered by Jews in occupied Yugoslavia during World War
11.
51. The principles established by the International Military Tribunal were carried for-
ward in a dozen subsequent trials prosecuted by General Telford Taylor, Justice Jackson's
successor. (See T. Taylor, Final Report to the Secretary of the Army on the Nuremberg War
Crimes Trials Under Control Council Law No. 10, Aug. 15, 1949.) A new law enacted by the
four occupying powers, Control Council Law No. 10, set out the procedure for further trials in
the various zones of occupation. It restated, and significantly expanded, the principles of the
London Charter. "Initiation of invasions of other countries" was now included as a crime
against peace, in addition to "planning, preparation, initiation or waging a war of aggression."
Allied Control Council Law No. 10, Dec. 20, 1945, reproduced in B.B. FERENCZ, DEFINING
INTERNATIONAL AGGRESSION: THE SEARCH FOR WORLD PEACE 491-96 (1975).
52. See AFFIRMATION OF THE PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW RECOGNIZED BY
THE CHARTER OF THE NUREMBERG TRIBUNAL, adopted by the U.N. General Assembly, Dec.
11, 1946, G.A. Res. 95 (1), U.N. Doc. A/236, at 1144 (1946).
53. For important discussions of the definition of punishment, see C.L. TEN, CRIME,
GUILT, AND PUNISHMENT: A PHILOSOPHICAL INTRODUCTION (1987); A. FLEW, The Justifica-
tion of Punishment, in THE PHILOSOPHY OF PUNISHMENT 83-87 (H.B. Acton ed. 1969); H.L.A.
HART. PUNISHMENT AND RESPONSIBILITY 4-6 (1968); J. FEINBERG, THE EXPRESSIVE FUNC-
TION OF PUNISHMENT, in SENTENCING (H. Gross and A. von Hirsch eds. 1981).
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to his wrongdoing;"' and (2) the utilitarian view, that punishment is
justifiable because it will maintain and possibly even strengthen the
social order."B Understood in terms-of Iraqi crimes, both justifica-
tions apply.
The point of the retributive view is not a narrow theory of ven-
geance, but expiation. While law and morality are not the same, the
absolute detachment of the two would confound the requirements of
a decent species and a virtuous human society. Punishment, inter
alia, is simply an integral part of justice, and its value must go be-
yond its capacity to reform. To leave Iraqi crimes unpunished, there-
fore, would be immoral and unjust.
There is also a very pragmatic reason for prosecuting Iraqi
crimes. Though it is unclear that punishment is always, or even usu-
ally, an effective deterrent, a trial of Saddam Hussein et al would
assuredly incapacitate the particular defendants from the commis-
sion of additional crimes and quite possibly inhibit other state lead-
ers from committing similar offenses in the future. The whole argu-
ment, in fact, can be extracted from Plato's Protagoras:
No one punishes those who have been guilty of injustice
solely because they have committed injustice, unless indeed he
punishes in a brutal and unreasonable manner. When anyone
makes use of his reason in inflicting punishment, he punishes not
on account of the fault that is past, for no one can bring it about
that what has been done may not have been done, but on ac-
count of a fault to come in order that the person punished may
54. A classical supporter of "retributive justice" was Immanuel Kant. Writing in Philos-
ophy of Law, Kant identifies the mode and measure of punishment as follows: "This is the
Right of Retaliation (justalionis), and properly understood, it is the only Principle which in
regulating a Public Court . . . can definitely assign both the quality and the quantity of a just
penalty." KANT, PHILOSOPHY OF LAW (1887) (Part 1I, "Public Right.") On the retributive
view generally, see: M. BASSIOUNI, SUBSTANTIVE CRIMINAL LAW 91-139 (1978); W. MOBERLY,
THE ETHICS OF PUNISHMENT 96-120 (1968); CL. TEN, CRIME, GUILT. AND PUNISHMENT 38-65
(1987); R. NOZICK. PHILOSOPHICAL EXPLANATIONS 363-97 (1981); J. KLEINIG, PUNISHMENT
AND DESERT (1973); Galligan, The Return to Retribution in Penal Theory, in CRIME, PROOF
AND PUNISHMENT 154-57 (C. Tapper ed. 1981); I. PRIMORATZ, JUSTIFYING LEGAL PUNISH-
MENT (1989) (especially pp. 67-110); T. HONDERICH. PUNISHMENT: THE SUPPOSED JUSTIFICA-
TIONS (1969) (especially pp. 22-51); G.W. PATON, A TEXTBOOK OF JURISPRUDENCE 320-26
(1964); H. OPPENHEIMER, THE RATIONALE OF PUNISHMENT (1975); M.M. MACKENZIE, PLATO
ON PUNISHMENT 21-33 (1981). For a broader but fascinating treatment, see also M. HENBERG,
RETRIBUTION: EVIL FOR EVIL IN ETHICS, LAW, AND LITERATURE (1990).
55. Emphasizing the deterrence aspects of punishment, the utilitarian view is, of course,
closely associated with Bentham (especially Principles of Penal Law). A particular application
of utilitarianism to jurisprudence, this view holds that punishment is morally justified by its
good consequences. Contrary to the most important and influential classical retributivists,
among whom Kant and Hegel stand out above all others, Bentham (whose philosophic roots on
this issue go back to Plato) bases his theory of punishment on the principle of "utility." This
principle, says Bentham, is "that principle which approves or disapproves of every action what-
soever, according to the tendency which it appears to have to augment or diminish the happi-
ness of the party whose interest is in question .... to promote or to oppose that happiness." J.
BENTHAM, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALS AND LEGISLATION 126 (W.
Harrison ed. 1960).
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not again commit the fault, that his punishment may restrain
from similar acts those persons who witness the punishment.56
56. See PLATONIC DIALOGS; PROTAGORAS § 324. See also GORGIAS § 525; REPUBLIC §§
380, 615; PHAEDO § 113; LAWS §§ 854, 862, 934, 957. As pointed out by Mary Margaret
MacKenzie, Protagoras' theory of punishment rejects the alleged violence and irrationality of
"straight retributivism." M. MACKENZIE, PLATO ON PUNISHMENT 189 (1981). For Plato, the
rationale of punishment lies in its orientation to the future, preventing the offender himself
from repeated wrongdoing and deterring others from similar offenses. Punishment is meant to
turn others from doing harm and to teach virtue.
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